G.R. No. 211303

G.R. No. 211303, June 15, 2021,
♦ Decision, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Zalameda, [J]

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 9, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)-En Banc (CTA-En Banc) in CTA EB No. 960, which affirmed the Decision4 dated September 7, 2012 and the Resolution5 dated November 12, 2012 of the CTA-Third Division in CTA Case No. 7731, denying petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC)'s claim for refund for alleged erroneously paid excise taxes on imported and locally purchased Jet A-1 fuel which it subsequently sold to international air carriers.

PSPC is a corporation engaged in the manufacture, processing, treatment, refinement, and sale of petroleum products, including Jet A-1 fuel.6 Between the period of February and March 2006, PSPC imported 28,578,673 liters of Jet A-1 fuel through its refinery in Tabangao, Batangas, and accordingly, paid the Bureau of Customs in Batangas (BOC) excise taxes at the rate of P3.67 per liter totaling ₱104,883,730.27.7 Within the same period, PSPC purchased locally 3,192,012 liters of Jet A-1 fuel from Chevron Philippines, Inc. (Chevron), and the latter passed-on the cost of the excise taxes it previously paid upon importation thereof to PSPC as part of the total bill.8 From February 27 to April 9, 2006, PSPC sold a total of 24,974,294 liters of Jet A-1 fuel to various international carriers for their consumption outside of the Philippines.9 On February 15, 2007, PSPC filed a claim for refund or tax credit with the Bureau of Internal Revenue Large Taxpayers Audit and Investigation Division II (BIR-LTAID II), alleging that the excise taxes it paid on the Jet A-1 fuel which was sold to international carriers was in the nature of erroneously or illegally collected taxes; hence, it was entitled to a refund in the total amount of ₱91,655,658.98.10 Due to the BIR-LTAID II's inaction, PSPC filed a Petition for Review11 with the CTA on February 15, 2008, docketed as CTA Case No. 7731.12

In a Decision13 dated September 7, 2012, the CTA-Third Division denied PSPC's claim for refund for lack of merit.14 In arriving at its conclusion, the CTA-Third Division relied on the Court's pronouncement in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (2012 Pilipinas Shell Decision),15 which declared that Section 135 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code)16 did not confer an excise tax exemption to local manufacturers of petroleum products; rather, said provision merely prohibits the shifting of the burden thereof to the international carriers who buy the same from them.17 In the same vein, the CTA-Third Division held that the excise taxes PSPC paid on the Jet A-1 fuel sold to international air carriers from February to April 2006 amounting to ₱91,655,658.98 could not be considered as erroneously or illegally paid.18

PSPC moved for reconsideration19 but was denied in a Resolution20 dated November 12, 2012; thus, it elevated21 the case to the CTA-En Banc, docketed as CTA EB No. 960.

In a Decision22 dated September 9, 2013, the CTA-En Banc denied PSPC's petition for lack of merit.23 It held that the 2012 Pilipinas Shell Decision was squarely applicable to the instant case due to the identity of the parties, the facts, the issues, and the laws applicable. It also held that the 2012 Pilipinas Shell Decision did not overturn established precedents since the issue involved therein dealt specifically with the issue of whether there was an express tax exemption grant under the Tax Code to local manufacturers of petroleum products who sell the same to international carriers, whereas previous cases dealt with determining who was the proper party to file a claim for refund for excise taxes.24

Unperturbed, PSPC moved for reconsideration,25 which was, however, denied in a Resolution26 dated February 3, 2014.

In the meantime, the 2012 Pilipinas Shell Decision was reconsidered by the Court through a Resolution27 dated February 19, 2014 (2014 Pilipinas Shell Resolution).

Consequently, on April 3, 2014, PSPC filed the present petition before the Court.28 In its petition, PSPC argues that the CTA-En Banc rulings should be reversed and set aside in light of the Court's pronouncements in the 2014 Pilipinas Shell Resolution.29 Based on the said Resolution, PSPC asserts that Section 135 (a) of the Tax Code should be interpreted as granting the exemption to the petroleum product itself since excise taxes are applicable to certain specific goods or articles. While manufacturers or producers of petroleum are liable to pay excise taxes, this liability is reversed when the same is sold to international carriers due to the exemption of the same product under Section 135 (a). Thus, the excise taxes that PSPC had previously paid became erroneously paid taxes which can be recovered pursuant to Sections 204 and 229 of the Tax Code.30

In a Manifestation31 filed on September 12, 2014, PSPC expressed that the Court has denied with finality all motions for reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in the 2014 Pilipinas Shell Resolution. Given the identity of the parties, factual settings, and issues raised with the instant case, PSPC prays that the Court resolves the present petition in the same manner pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis.32

On September 18, 2014, the OSG, representing respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, filed its Comment33 to PSPC's petition. It countered that the 2014 Pilipinas Shell Resolution was inapplicable to the present case since the said Resolution specifically involved the application of bilateral Air Transport Agreements with other countries.34 As such, it claimed that PSPC was liable to pay taxes due on the imported Jet A-1 fuel pursuant to Sections 131 (a) to 148 of the Tax Code, pointing out that PSPC was not a manufacturer or producer of the petroleum products but merely an importer thereof.35

On March 2, 2017, PSPC filed its Reply.36 It reiterated the applicability of the 2014 Pilipinas Shell Resolution to the instant case. It also added that the doctrine in the said case was already affirmed by the Court En Banc in Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (2015 Chevron)37 and by the Court's Third Division in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,38 docketed as G.R. No. 180402 which involved a similar claim for refund for excise taxes paid on gas and fuel oils that were sold to various international carriers. Thus, PSPC echoes its earlier prayer to grant its claim for refund by virtue of the principle of stare decisis.39

Notably, this case was raffled to a member of the Third Division of the Court on March 10, 2014. On December 7, 2020, the case was elevated to the Court En Banc, which was then accepted by the latter on January 5, 2021, owing to the possibility of reversing a doctrine or principle of law previously laid down by the Court, i.e., the Court's pronouncements in the 2014 Pilipinas Shell Resolution and the 2015 Chevron.40 After due deliberations on the varying positions in this case, the members of the Banc voted to assign the case to the present ponente for final decision only last June 15, 2021.41

The principal issue to be resolved is whether or not PSPC is entitled to its claim for refund for the excise taxes it paid on the Jet A-1 fuel sold to international carriers from February 27 to April 9, 2006.

At the outset, it bears stressing that the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, or "to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established,"42 is applicable to the present case.

To recount, "[t]he doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument."43 The purpose thereof is to secure certainty and stability of judicial decisions.44 Although the doctrine of stare decisis is not an absolute rule,45 absent strong and compelling reasons, cases based on substantially similar facts and questions of law ought to follow precedent in order to preserve the virtue of predictability expected from this Court.46

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,47 the Court applied the principle of stare decisis to uphold PSPC's claim for tax refund of excise taxes paid in light of its importation of fuel sold to international carriers, on the basis of the 2014 Pilipinas Shell Resolution "since the facts, issues, and even the parties involved [were] exactly identical."48

Similarly, the present case involves PSPC's right to claim refund for the excise taxes it paid on petroleum products later sold to various international carriers. More significantly, the very same question of law is to be resolved by the Court in the present case, and that there is no remarkable distinction in factual circumstances. Thus, as there appears to be no compelling reason to deviate from settled precedent, by virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis, PSPC's petition should be granted, and the CTA-En Banc's rulings should be set aside in this case.

This notwithstanding, for the guidance of the bench, bar, and the public, the Court takes this opportunity to elucidate on certain conceptual distinctions in the 2014 Pilipinas Shell Resolution vis-à-vis the Court's subsequent pronouncements in the 2015 Chevron. Furthermore, the ponencia deems it apt to lay down the foundational principles and concepts relative to excise taxes to sufficiently address the counterarguments offered by the other members of the Banc who have dissented against the majority ruling.

By its nature, an excise tax under the Philippine taxation system pertains to the tax levied on certain goods, whether at a specific rate or ad valorem.49 As case law characterizes,50 an excise tax is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, but rather a levy on certain articles which are manufactured or imported for domestic consumption. It is equally settled that the accrual or liability to pay the same arises immediately upon importation or as soon as the goods come into existence when manufactured.51

Furthermore, excise taxes are indirect taxes,52 as opposed to direct taxes. Pertinently, these types of taxes relate to the statutory taxpayer who is obligated to pay taxes to the government. In this relation, one must understand the concepts of tax incidence (or the actual liability to pay the tax) and tax burden (the economic burden of the tax incident).

On the one hand, direct taxes are "those that are exacted from the very person who, it is intended or desired, should pay them; they are impositions for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business he is engaged in,"53 which means, the tax incidence and tax burden fall upon the same person.

On the other, indirect taxes are "those that are demanded, in the first instance, from, or are paid by, one person in the expectation and intention that he can shift the burden to someone else. Stated elsewise, indirect taxes are taxes wherein the liability for the payment of the tax falls on one person but the burden thereof can be shifted or passed on to another person, such as when the tax is imposed upon goods before reaching the consumer who ultimately pays for it. When the seller passes on the tax to his buyer, he, in effect, shifts the tax burden, not the liability to pay it, to the purchaser as part of the price of goods sold or services rendered."54 As jurisprudence explains, "this shifting process, otherwise known as 'passing on,' is largely a contractual affair between the parties. Meaning, even if the purchaser effectively pays the value of the tax, the manufacturer [or] producer (in case of goods manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic sales or consumption or for any other disposition) or the owner or importer (in case of imported goods) [is] still regarded as the statutory [taxpayer] under the law. To this end, the purchaser does not really pay the tax; rather, he only pays the seller more for the goods because of the latter's obligation to the government as the statutory taxpayer."55

Thus, when it comes to indirect taxes, the statutory taxpayer remains to be the manufacturer or importer of the articles.(awÞhi( Despite being able to pass the burden of the tax to the buyer as an inherent component of the total price of the article, the onus to actually pay the excise tax and to remit the returns incidental thereto remains with the statutory taxpayer, who must correspondingly benefit from any tax exemption. In effect, upon the sale of the goods, the portion of the price corresponding to the excise tax originally paid by the manufacturer or importer is not per se the excise tax liability imposed under Section 12956 of the Tax Code. The price passed on, and assumed by the buyer of the goods, is therefore no different from any other component cost in arriving at the price of the article sold, such as raw material cost or distributed overhead expenses. In a similar situation, the Court held that "[e]ven if the consumers or purchasers ultimately pay for the tax, they are not considered the taxpayers. The fact that [statutory taxpayer/importer], on whom the excise tax is imposed, can shift the tax burden to its purchasers does not make the latter the taxpayers and the former the withholding agent. [The purchaser/end-consumer] ultimately bears the tax burden, but this does not transform [its] status into a statutory taxpayer."57 This distinction between statutory taxpayer and the purchaser who assumes the tax burden when the costs of the taxes are passed on to it as part of the purchase price is material to understand the "exemption" granted under Section 135 governing excise taxes.

At its core, the purpose of a grant of tax exemption is "some public benefit or interest, which the law-making body considers sufficient to offset the monetary loss entailed in the grant of the exemption."58 However, the object of the grant of tax exemption is not necessarily a natural person similar to how "the objects of taxation are either persons, property[,] and property rights within the jurisdiction of the taxing authority."59 As such, generally speaking, the object of tax exemptions may either be personal or impersonal. Personal exemptions conceptually pertain to those "granted directly in favor of such persons as are within the contemplation of the law granting the exemption."60 On the other hand, an impersonal exemption may be said to exist when a tax exemption is "granted directly in favor of a certain class of property."61 If the tax exemption is impersonal in nature, then, regardless of who transacts with the property, the exemption should still apply. This framework of personal and impersonal tax exemptions underpins the exemption granted under Section 135 on excisable articles.

Notably, the Court, in the 2014 Pilipinas Shell Resolution, stated that the "exemption from payment of excise tax" under Section 135 is "conferred on international carriers who purchased the petroleum products of respondent";62 thus, in said case, the tax exemption under Section 135 covering said products was characterized as a grant of a personal tax exemption.

However, in the subsequent case of 2015 Chevron,63 the Court effectively abandoned the foregoing characterization, and instead, correctly categorized that the tax exemption under Section 135 is "in favor of the petroleum products on which the excise tax was levied in the first place."64 As such, the Court, in 2015 Chevron, validated the nature of Section 135 as a provision conferring an impersonal tax exemption, which, in fact, cogently squares with the nature of excise taxes being a tax on property, rather than a tax on persons.

Being an impersonal tax exemption, Section 135 cannot be therefore interpreted as an exemption primarily conferred to the buyers because "they are not under any legal duty to pay the excise tax."65 To reiterate, upon the buyers' purchase of the articles, the "excise tax" they pay, if any, is, in reality, a mere passed-on cost that forms part of the purchase price. Hence, while purchasers bear the economic burden, they do not, by the mere fact of assuming the passed-on costs, become legally regarded as statutory taxpayers. In this regard, Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting aptly observed that "a tax immunity would lose its meaning if we insist that it is available only to a person who, in the first place, has no obligation to pay the tax due on the subject article/transaction. It can only be enjoyed in its truest sense by the person who is liable for the tax and wishes to be immune from therefrom."66

The impersonal nature of the tax exemption is also expressed in the wording itself of Section 135:

As worded, the object of Section 135 itself is not the enumerated persons but rather, the "petroleum products sold." Palpably, based on Section 135's phraseology, the enumerated persons are merely descriptive of the petroleum products, i.e., the persons to which the products are sold to. As such, the wording of Section 135 hews more closely with the character of impersonal tax exemptions, which is, in turn, consistent with the nature of excise taxes as taxes not on persons but on the goods/articles. As equally observed by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, "[t]he succeeding paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) do not confer nor refer to the tax exemption. Paragraphs (a), (b)[,] and (c) simply enumerate and describe the entities to whom petroleum products must be sold to make the excise tax exemption operative."67

At this juncture, it is likewise relevant to mention that since an excise tax is in the nature of a property tax, it is thus erroneous to consider the operation of a tax exemption thereto in the same way as a transactional tax, wherein every purchaser and seller may be considered as a statutory taxpayer for every succeeding transaction, only ending with the final consumer. Rather, the exemption under Section 135 must be reconciled with the idea that liability for the tax attaches to the articles as soon as they come into existence or immediately upon importation.

The Court, in the 2015 Chevron, had already settled that the true status of the goods, whether ultimately taxable or tax-exempt, is actually conditional or subject to confirmation upon the sale of the articles to any of the entities enumerated under Section 135. This conditional taxability can actually be seen in another related provision in the Tax Code, i.e., Section 131 thereof:

As may be gleaned from Section 131 as above-cited, although certain articles may be free from excise taxes upon importation, they may subsequently become subject to the same depending on the subsequent buyer. This is essentially the same principle of subsequent confirmation espoused by the 2015 Chevron, and is also a necessary consequence of excise tax being a property tax, and not a tax on persons.

Considering that the status of the petroleum products as tax-exempt solidifies upon the sale to any of the entities enumerated under Section 135, any excise taxes which were previously paid thereon would then be considered as "erroneously or illegally collected," and therefore, subject to refund. In turn, the petroleum products become exempt from excise taxes once it is determined that they are to be sold to, among others, international earners. This reflects Section 135's wording, i.e., that the petroleum products are considered as tax exempt once they are "sold to [inter alia] x x x [i]nternational carriers."

Based on (a) the nature of excise taxes as a property tax and an indirect tax, and (b) the principle that a buyer, when shouldering the tax burden, does not become the statutory taxpayer, it is thus clear that the purchaser of local products (such as international carriers) cannot be deemed to have been conferred a tax exemption when it has not been imposed a tax liability. In the ordinary course of things, international carriers do not manufacture or import petroleum products and hence, are not statutory taxpayers to which the exemption under Section 135 could pertain. If anything, international carriers merely bear the tax burden when the costs therefor are passed on to them by the actual manufacturers or importers. However, as earlier discussed, the "passing on" of the tax burden is largely a contractual affair between the parties and should not determine the tax incidence imposed by law unless the contrary is provided. As such, the tax exemption under Section 135 must correspondingly benefit the one who actually bears the liability to pay the same (i.e., the importers/manufacturers of petroleum products sold to international carriers, among others), and not the one who simply bears the economic burden thereof (i.e., the purchasers of the products, such as international carriers).

Prefaced by these foundational principles, the ponencia now deems it fit to address the minority's contrary position in this case that Section 135 instead confers a "tax exemption" in favor of international carriers, among others, and not the actual statutory taxpayers, i.e., the importers/manufacturers of petroleum products sold to international earners.

For ready reference, the crux of the dissents may be condensed into the following contentions:

As to the first contention, it has been earlier discussed that the manufacturer's/importer's right to claim a refund for petroleum products sold to international carriers is actually supported by the text of Section 135 of the Tax Code. To repeat, Section 135 states that "[p]etroleum products sold to the following are exempt from excise tax."71 Hence, while the law does not explicitly state who should benefit from this impersonal tax exemption, it is nonetheless clear that the tax exemption must correspondingly benefit the statutory taxpayer, i.e., the petroleum products' manufacturers/importers, and not any of the enumerated entities in Section 135 of the Tax Code (e.g., international carriers), who, in the first place, do not bear the tax incidence of the excise taxes, but only bear the tax burden from passed-on costs. Thus, while the general rule is that tax exemptions and tax refunds should be strictly construed against the taxpayer,72 this general rule does not apply in this case as the conferral thereof in favor of the petroleum products' manufacturers/importers is made clear by the provision's reasonable interpretation bearing in mind the nature of excise taxes.

With respect to the second contention, it has already been clarified that the entities enumerated under Section 135 only bear the tax burden of the excise taxes paid by the manufacturer/importer. This tax burden is a component cost that forms part of the purchase price of the excisable goods, which are merely passed on. To stress, the passing-on of the tax-burden is largely a contractual affair between the parties. Hence, the tax exemption under Section 135 does not – as it could not – pertain to a prohibition barring the parties from engaging in the "passing-on" of the tax burden which is but a contractual affair. Instead, Section 135 must be construed as a tax exemption which favors the statutory taxpayer of the excisable articles, i.e., the manufacturer/importer of the petroleum products which are sold to international carriers, among others.

Besides, the theory that Section 135 (a) should be interpreted as merely prohibiting the passing on of the excise taxes to international carriers is anathema to the apparent intent behind the tax exemption.

To expound, as explained by the Court in the 2014 Pilipinas Shell Resolution, Section 135 (a) represents "our Government['s] compliance with the Chicago Convention, its subsequent resolutions/annexes, and the air transport agreements entered into by the Philippine Government with various countries."73 "The exemption from excise tax of aviation fuel purchased by international carriers for consumption outside the Philippines fulfills a treaty obligation pursuant to which our Government supports the promotion and expansion of international travel through avoidance of multiple taxation and ensuring the viability and safety of international air travel."74

To restrict Section 135 (a) to benefit only international carriers (despite not even being statutory taxpayers) would clearly prejudice manufacturers or importers as they are now effectively prohibited from recouping the cost of excise taxes from their sale of petroleum products to international carriers. As such, the logical impact is for them to inflate other component costs, else they suffer losses or at least render their businesses unprofitable. This, in turn, would result in a selective treatment by international carriers to purchase their fuel from low-tax/tax-free jurisdictions, ultimately stifling international air travel, contrary to the policy sought to be advanced by the grant of tax exemption. In this relation, it is apt to note that in the same 2014 Pilipinas Shell Resolution, the Court pointed out that:

Without any international agreement on taxing fuel, it is highly likely that moves to impose duty on international flights, either at a domestic or European level, would encourage 'tankering': carriers filling their aircraft as full as possible whenever they landed outside the EU to avoid paying tax. Clearly this would be entirely counterproductive. Aircraft would be travelling further than necessary to fill up in low-tax jurisdictions; in addition they would be burning up more fuel when carrying the extra weight of a full fuel tank.75

These sentiments are also practically echoed by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, opining that "it is erroneous to say that Section 135 should be construed as a prohibition on the manufacturers, producers, and importers from passing on the tax burden in the form of an addition to price to the international carriers and exempt entities because the sellers may nonetheless increase the selling price in the guise of additional margin if only to cover the excise tax that could not be shifted. It must be borne in mind that the manufacturers, producers, or importers turned sellers ultimately determine the price they will sell the products."76

And finally, in response to the third contention, it must be clarified that the ponencia does not assert that the exemption, and the consequent right to refund, should be granted based on some hypothetical violation of treaty obligations. Rather, the ponencia merely recognizes that the present reading of Section 135 is more attune to the ratio legis of the provision as above-stated. It is well-settled that in reading the law, the Court must give life to the ratio behind the same because "[t]he intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute."77 To interpret Section 135 as a mere prohibition against "passing-on" – as the minority does – is not only incongruent with the nature and workings of excise taxes, it would also defeat the spirit and intent behind the tax exemption – that is, "the promotion and expansion of international travel through avoidance of multiple taxation and ensuring the viability and safety of international air travel."78

All told, the Court concludes that upon PSPC's sale of its imported petroleum products to various international carriers from February 27 to April 9, 2006, the tax exemption under Section 135 (a) of the Tax Code came into effect. Consequently, the excise taxes it previously paid on the said petroleum products became erroneously or illegally collected taxes that are proper subject of a claim for refund under Sections 204 and 229 of the same law.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court cannot – as of yet – declare that PSPC is entitled to the entirety of its refund claim. On this score, the observations of Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Rodil V. Zalameda are well-taken that PSPC should not be entitled to a refund of the excise taxes pertaining to the Jet A-1 fuel it purchased from Chevron.79

To expound, it must be highlighted that the 24,974,294 liters of Jet A-1 fuel sold by PSPC to international carriers subject of its present claim for tax refund came from two (2) sources: first, from direct importation, amounting to 28,578,673 liters; and second, from the local purchase from Chevron, amounting to 3,192,012 liters.

Based on the discussions above, PSPC may claim refund for the excise taxes on the Jet A-1 fuel that it imported itself, considering that it was the statutory taxpayer in that instance.

However, the same is not true for the fuel purchased from Chevron. Again, the standing principle is that the "passing on" of the tax burden is largely a contractual affair between the parties and such affair does not determine the tax incidence imposed by law unless the contrary is provided. Here, when PSPC purchased Jet A-1 fuel from Chevron and paid the corresponding excise taxes due thereon as part of the purchase price, it did not operate to transform PSPC into the statutory taxpayer of the corresponding excise taxes. In reality, what PSPC paid was merely the tax burden, and hence, it cannot benefit from the tax exemption under Section 135 which operates to alleviate the tax incidence. Stated otherwise, in the case of the 3,192,012 liters purchased from Chevron, PSPC was merely a purchaser of the said fuel. Hence, even if it was subsequently sold to international carriers, PSPC could not invoke the exemption under Section 135 (a) because the tax incidence remained with Chevron. At the time that Chevron sold the fuel to PSPC (who is not an international carrier or any of the enumerated persons in Section 135), the excise taxes already became due and demand able, and PSPC's eventual sale thereof to an international carrier cannot anymore negate the accrual of the excise tax liability.

That being said, the Court cannot therefore make a categorical declaration as to the precise refund amount to award PSPC given that the records do not clearly show the composition of the 24,974,294 liters of Jet A-1 fuel actually sold to international carriers. Particularly, records fail to disclose the specific amounts coming from each source, whether directly imported by PSPC or locally purchased by Chevron. Thus, the Court deems it prudent to remand the case back to the CTA to make factual determinations (and accordingly make the corresponding dispositions) on the following:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 9, 2013 and the Resolution dated February 3, 2014 rendered by the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)-En Banc in CTA EB No. 960, as well as the Decision dated September 7, 2012 and Resolution dated November 12, 2012 of the CTA-Third Division in CTA Case No. 7731 are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the CTA in accordance with this Decision.

Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Carandang, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, and Rosario, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., I dissent. see separate opinion
Caguioa, J., please see concurring opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, J., see dissent.
Inting, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Zalameda, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Delos Santos, J., I join the dissent of J. Leonen.
J. Lopez, J., I join the dissent of J. Zalameda.