G.R. No. 212717, March 11, 2020,
♦ Decision, Reyes, Jr., [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]

[ G.R. No. 212717, March 11, 2020 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. ARIEL S. CALINGO AND CYNTHIA MARCELLANA-CALINGO, RESPONDENTS.

DISSENTING OPINION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The ponencia reverses the Court of Appeals' Decision dated September 9, 20131 viz.:

However, this Court refuses to accept as credible the assessment of Dr. Lopez as there was no other evidence which established the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Cynthia's alleged incapacity, it is but necessary to provide corroborative evidence to exhibit the required legal parameters.

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Likewise, Cynthia's sexual infidelity is not a satisfactory proof of psychological incapacity. To be a ground to nullify a marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which makes him/her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

As discussed, there was no evidence which prove that such rises to the level of psychological incapacity within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code, warranting the severance of Cynthia and Ariel's marital bonds.

Unequivocally, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person.

Hence, contrary to CA's decision, the fact that Cynthia is "mabunganga" and had extra-marital affairs are not sufficient indictors of a psychological disorder.2

I dissent.

I.

First. Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez's assessments were not unsubstantiated. They were based not only on his interview with Ariel himself but also on his interviews with Francisca A. Bilason3 and Ruben Kalaw.4 Although Bilason and Kalaw themselves did not testify in court, Dr. Lopez personally testified on the questions he asked of these witnesses and their corresponding answers. It cannot be said, therefore, that the narratives of these persons which Dr. Lopez himself examined and evaluated are hearsay.

The good doctor also factored in Cynthia's family background in his diagnosis. He, too, considered veritable facts on record pertaining to the character of the parties, their psychological profiles, their behavior, the people's perception of them vis-à-vis the criteria of antecedence, incurability, and gravity of Cynthia's supposed psychological incapacity. Ultimately, Dr. Lopez came out with his expert opinion that Cynthia was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations to her husband.

Notably, Dr. Lopez is the same doctor whose evaluations the Court had given credence to in cases where we granted petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage on ground of psychological incapacity, viz.:

Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, was presented as an expert witness. Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to gather information on her family background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and subjected her to a battery of psychological tests. Dr. Lopez also interviewed Rodolfo's best friend.

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Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity."

Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the severe forms of personality disorder, even more severe than the other personality disorders like borderline and narcissistic personality disorders. Dr. Lopez explained that Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably caused by a pathogenic parental model. Rodolfo's family background showed that his father was a psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic contamination called double insanity, a symptom similar to his father's. Dr. Lopez further claimed that Rodolfo's disorder was serious and incurable because of his severe paranoia.

Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo's incapacity to perform his marital obligations.

(De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, G.R. No. 188400, March 8, 2017; emphases supplied, citations omitted)

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.

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The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent's testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez's common conclusion of respondent's psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner's version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's expert witnesses.

(Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006; emphases supplied, citations omitted)

Second. There was allegedly no evidence showing that Cynthia's psychological incapacity is within the level required by Article 36 of the Family Code. But what evidence can be more convincing, nay, credible, than the detailed account of Ariel himself who experienced his wife's psychological incapacity up close on countless occasions? Ariel testified, viz.:

FISCAL

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Q But then you stated that you kept on transferring from one place to another. What was the reason?

A Because Cynthia was very quarrelsome if not with the neighborhood with the landlady or the landlord.

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Q Mr. witness, you said that after your civil wedding you also had your church wedding?

A Yes, ma'am, after a year.

Q Who suggested of having a church wedding?

A It was suggested by her auntie.

Q Did it bring you more blessings?

A Not really, it became worst (sic), ma'am.

Q Now, you said in paragraph 10 of your Affidavit that after your church wedding, Cynthia's quarrelsome behavior became more pronounced by her madly shouting, cursing and throwing stuffs (sic) to you?

A Yes, ma'am.

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Q So, she would be the type who is the violent type and not the silent type?

A Yes, ma'am, and in fact, she already became scandalous.

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Q Mr. Witness, in paragraph 13, you stated that your wife, again, fooled around the second time with another male neighbor a certain Louie, is that correct?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q How did you now this?

A There was one time when I went home earlier, because I used to go on overtime, I found Louie naked under my bed hiding from me.

Q Mr. Witness, you stated in paragraph 14 of your affidavit about your wife's deceptive, sex-maniacal behavior. What do you mean by that?

A Promiscuous.

Q Not with you?

A Not really. I think with any man na matipuhan niya.

Q By the way, Mr. Witness, how long did you stay together as husband and wife?

A We stayed together for about 3 years.

Q For only 3 years?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So, you separated in 1984.

A Yes, ma'am.

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Q For how long have you been separated with the respondent?

A More than 20 years, ma'am.

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Q So, after the total separation in 1984 you have no more contact with your wife?

A Completely no contact.

xxx5

(Emphases supplied)

Equally important is the reputation and credibility of Dr. Lopez as a psychologist whose findings the Court had accorded credence and reliance in various cases.

Third. According to the ponencia, the Court of Appeals erred when it deemed Cynthia's sexual infidelity and being "mabunganga" sufficient to warrant the nullity of her marriage to Ariel.

As it was, however, the Court of Appeals did not hinge its rulings on these grounds alone. In truth, there are many more, viz.:

His wife's being "mabunganga" and having relationships with other men, are strong indications of a psychological disorder.

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Cynthia's quarrelsome attitude, and the incessant bickerings with neighbors and the spouses' landlords, which force the spouses to transfer from one place to another can be traced back to her [Histrionic Personality Disorder]. In addition, her being "mabunganga" is clearly an indication that she would not listen to reason in discussion and would be enraged for no apparent reason at all.

The totality of evidence all boils down to the fact that the marriage is doomed from the start.

Cynthia's sexual infidelity, by itself, is sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity given that she committed it not just once, but multiple times. In fact, she bore, not just a child but twins with a man other than her husband; in addition, she harbored a half-naked man under their maternal bed; she was verbally abusive, as she often got angry at Ariel and shouted curses at him;6 she had aggressive tendencies towards others and would pick fights with neighbors and landlords because of constant gossiping, causing them to transfer residence five (5) times in just three (3) years of life together as husband and wife;7 and she had, on separate occasions, thrown knives and other deadly objects at Ariel. If this is not psychological incapacity, what is?

II.

The Court has clarified that the guidelines in Republic v. Molina8 are not meant to straightjacket all petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The merits are determined on a case-to-case basis, as no case is on all fours with another.9

In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,10 we ruled that the parties' marriage was void on the basis of psychological incapacity and noted:

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a straightjacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.

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In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage. (Emphasis supplied; Citations omitted)

In Republic v. Javier11 for instance, respondent Martin Javier testified on his own behalf and presented the psychological findings of Dr. Elias D. Adamos. Based on her Psychological Report on Martin and Psychological Impression Report on Michelle Mercado-Javier, Martin and Michelle had Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

In his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, Martin testified that Michelle was confrontational even before their marriage, she always challenged his opinions on what was proper, and acted recklessly without consideration of his feelings. Dr. Adamos corroborated this and noted that Michelle's disorder was a result of her childhood trauma. He also added that she constantly lied to Martin and openly had extra-marital affairs.

Martin's disorder, on the other hand, was found to have been rooted in his traumatic childhood experiences with his violent and abusive father. He thus had unrealistic values and standards on his own marriage, proposed unconventional sexual practices, and often quarreled with Michelle. Worse, he had inflicted physical harm on her. He was found to be self-entitled, immature, and self-centered.

Taken together, the Court found these manifestations as proof of psychological incapacity and upheld the declaration of the marriage as void ab initio.

Here, records show that: (1) Ariel himself suffered an emotionally disturbed personality; (2) Cynthia was diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder with Histrionic Personality Disorder Features; (3) She was unfaithful to him and even once admitted that her children were not his; (4) He caught her with another man; (5) She was verbally abusive against him; and (6) She has attempted to take his life by throwing knives at him on different occasions.

Article 68 of the Family Code, under Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife provides:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a)

True, each action or omission which Cynthia has done or incurred, taken singly, may constitute a mere ground for legal separation. Taken together, however, they constitute a solid ground for psychological incapacity. How can a seemingly incurable adulteress who is unapologetically verbally and physically abusive still be able to comply with her duties as a wife? Are her acts those of love, respect, and fidelity?

III.

The remedy of psychological incapacity, as the prototypical and prevailing doctrine understands it to be, does not work as well in practice as it is in theory. There are real needs and actual mischief that the remedy seeks to address - the dysfunctional marriage and the decaying family that the latter breeds. To make the remedy responsive and relevant, some adjustments have to be written to the prototypical and prevailing doctrine.

For one, proof by an expert of the existence of a personality disorder should only be one of the means of proving by presumption the existence of psychological incapacity. For another, it is high-time to abandon the prevailing insistence on proof of clinically-identified personality disorders as the sole elemental source of psychological incapacity. It should also be enough to prove mental state or state of mind of an inability to fulfil the marital and parental duties as a trigger to the ascription of psychological incapacity to a spouse.

It is also apt to abandon the requirement of juridical antecedence so that the trigger mental states or states of mind that develop post-marriage can be accounted for. To be sure, it is not illogical or contrary to common experience that love blinds only for so long, and thereafter, when emotions have subsided and the dynamics of having to interact with another breathes a life of its own, the mind has stopped to function in the marital partnership and duties are no longer being fulfilled, there is no love and respect but screaming silence, violence and poison, these experiences are relevant to a finding of psychological incapacity and should not be shut off only because they happen post-marriage.

Lastly, incurability or permanence should now be seen and analyzed in terms of a spouse's failure to reconcile with the other despite bona fide endeavours to do so.

A final note. We also cannot ignore the fact that Ariel and Cynthia have not been in contact since their separation in 1984 or for thirty-six (36) years now. What marriage, therefore, do we seek to preserve here? If these manifestations, taken together, do not establish psychological incapacity, what more are we looking for?

I, therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the dispositions of the Court of Appeals granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.



Footnotes

1 CA-G.R. CV No. 94407.

2 Ponencia, pp. 5-6; citations omitted.

3 A head therapist who has known both Ariel and Cynthia for more than 30 years.

4 Friend of both Ariel and Cynthia both for longer than 25 years.

5 Rollo, pp. 92-99.

6 Rollo, p. 118.

7 Id. at 92-93.

8 335 Phil. 664-693 (1997).

9 Republic v. Javier, G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018, 861 SCRA 683, 691, citing Bier v. Bier, et al., 570 Phil. 442, 448-449 (2008).

10 598 Phil. 666, 695-698 (2009).

11 G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018, 861 SCRA 683, 686.


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