FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 192442, August 09, 2017 ]
BENEDICT N. ROMANA, PETITIONER, V. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION / EDUARDO U. MANESE AND/OR PRINCESS CRUISE LINE, LTD., RESPONDENTS.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, CJ:
I concur with the majority that petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits for failing to establish the four requisites of compensability under Section 32-A of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-going Ships (POEA-SEC). Notably, the initial theory of petitioner was that his illness was caused by an accident while he was on board, when a piece of metal ceiling fell and hit his head.1 In his appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), he modified his theory by arguing anew that his brain tumor was probably aggravated by his constant exposure to different chemicals and dust particles.2 He has not, however, supplied any proof of the accident, much less the details of his supposed exposure to carcinogens and other harmful chemicals.
We would be hard put to conclude that the brain tumor of petitioner was caused or aggravated by his work on the basis of his bare declaration that his duties as mechanical fitter constantly exposed him to carcinogens and other harmful chemicals. Mere allegations do not constitute evidence.3
I cannot agree, though, with the approach employed by the ponencia and the subsequent clarification that the majority now proposes with respect to the rulings in Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Phils.), Inc.,4 Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel,5 and Dohle-Philman Manning Agency, Inc. v. Gazzingan.6
My misgivings stem from the established rule in compensation proceedings that whoever claims the benefits provided by law should prove the entitlement by substantial evidence. Hence, the burden is on the seafarer to prove that he suffered from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract.7
Besides, the proffered technical demarcation between work-relatedness and compensability diverges from the clear provisions of the 2000 POEA-SEC, Section 20(B) of which provides:
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
x x x x
4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed, as work-related.8
Applying the above provisions, we ruled in a number of cases9 that for an illness to be compensable under the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must have been work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.
On the issue of whether or not the illness is work-related, Estate of Ortega v. Court of Appeals10 is instructive:
Under the Definition of Terms found in the Standard Contract, a work-related illness is defined as "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied". An illness not otherwise listed in Section 32-A is disputably presumed work-related. This presumption works in favor of petitioner, because it then becomes incumbent upon respondents to dispute or overturn this presumption.
Lung cancer is not one of the occupational diseases listed in the Standard Contract. In fact, the only types of cancer on the list are "cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder (papilloma of the bladder), and "cancer, epithellomatous or ulceration of the skin or of the corneal surface of the eye due to tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral oil or paraffin, or compound product." At most, there is only a. disputable presumption that lung cancer is work-related. In determining whether an illness is indeed work-related, we will still use the requisites laid down by Section 32-A of the Standard Contract, to wit:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2.1aшphi1 The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.11
In Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena,12 we explained the interplay between the two requisites of compensability and the disputable presumption of work-relatedness under Section 20 (B)(4) as follows:
As we pointed out above, Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC governs the compensation and benefits for the work-related injury or illness that a seafarer on board sea-going vessels may have suffered during the term of his employment contract. This section should be read together with Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC that enumerates the various diseases deemed occupational and therefore compensable. Thus, for a seafarer to be entitled to the compensation and benefits under Section 20-B, the disability causing illness or injury must be one of those listed under Section 32-A.
Of course, the law recognizes that under certain circumstances, certain diseases not otherwise considered as an occupational disease under the POEA-SEC may nevertheless have been caused or aggravated by the seafarer's working conditions. In these situations, the law recognizes the inherent paucity of the list and the difficulty, if not the outright improbability, of accounting for all the known and unknown diseases that may be associated with, caused or aggravated by such working conditions.
Hence, the POEA-SEC provides for a disputable presumption of work-relatedness for non-POEA-SEC-listed occupational disease and the resulting illness or injury which he may have suffered during the term of his employment contract.
This disputable presumption is made in the law to signify that the non-inclusion in the list of compensable diseases/illnesses does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits. In other words, the disputable presumption does not signify an automatic grant of compensation aid/or benefits claim; the seafarer must still prove his entitlement to disability benefits by substantial evidence of his illness' work-relatedness.
x x x x
The LA and the CA may have correctly afforded Ravena the benefit of the legal presumption of work-relatedness. The legal correctness of the CA's appreciation of Ravena's claim, however, ends here for as we pointed out above, Section 20-B (4) affords only a disputable presumption that should be read together with the conditions specified by Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC. Under Section 32-A, for the disputably-presumed disease resulting in disability to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks describe therein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
Ravena failed to prove the work-relatedness of his ampullary cancer as he failed to satisfy these conditions.13
In the recent case Madridejos v. NYK-FIL Ship Management,14 we applied a similar framework of analysis. In that case, the illness sought to be compensated was a sebaceous cyst, which was not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32 of the 2000 POEA-SEC. While we conceded that the disputable presumption of work-relatedness under Section 20(B)(4) worked in favor of the seafarer, his claim had to be denied for failure to establish causality. We ruled thus:
Even assuming that Madridejos was medically repatriated, he still cannot claim for disability benefits since his sebaceous cyst was not work-related.
x x x x
Madridejos was diagnosed with sebaceous cyst to the right of his umbilicus during the effectivity of his contract as evinced by the findings of Dr. Byrne. Conformably, Labor Arbiter Demaisip affirmed that Madridejos' illness was acquired during the term of his employment contract. Disputed, however, is whether Madridejos' sebaceous cyst was work-related.1aшphi1
x x x x
Madridejos insists that his sebaceous cyst was work-related and compensable since the risk of acquiring it increased due to his working conditions. NYK-FIL opposes, claiming that Madridejos' cyst was not attributable to the nature of his job. It asserts that Madridejos failed to show "even a single realistic connection" between his illness and his employment. NYK-FIL says that Madridejos never met any accident and there was no medical or accident report to prove its occurrence.
A work-related illness is "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A with the conditions set therein satisfied."
Section 32-A provides:
Section 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
The following diseases are considered as occupational when contracted under working conditions involving the risks described herein.
A sebaceous cyst is not included under Section 32 or 32-A of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency Standard Employment Contract. However, the guidelines expressly provide that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 "are disputably presumed as work[-]related."
Similarly, for an illness to be compensable, "it is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer." It is enough that there is "a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had."
The disputable presumption implies "that the non-inclusion in the list of compensable diseases/illnesses does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits." Similarly, "the disputable presumption does not signify an automatic grant of compensation and/or benefits claim." There is still a need for the claimant to establish, through substantial evidence, that his illness is work-related.15
Section 32-A, therefore, sets the parameters of causality or reasonable linkage between the injury or illness suffered and the work conditions of the claimant. Accordingly, case law provides that the legal presumption of work-relatedness in favor of the claimant holds only to the extent that it allows compensation even for a non-occupational disease, as long the four conditions under Section 32-A are established. It is my view that this principle finds basis in the plain text of the 2000 POEA-SEC and settled evidentiary rules in compensation proceedings.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the Petition for Review and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals Decision dated 11 February 2010 and Resolution dated 27 May 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108306.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 58-67.
2 CA rollo, pp. 128-140 (Memorandum of Appeal dated 2 May 2006).
3 Dela Llana v. Biong, G.R. No. 182356, 4 December 2013, 711 SCRA 522.
4 676 Phil. 313 (2011).
5 707 Phil. 210 (2013).
6 G.R. No. 199568, 17 June 2015, 759 SCRA 209.
7 Dizon v. Naess Shipping Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 201834, 1 June 2016 citing Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Aligway, G.R. No. 201793, 16 September 2015; Talosig v. Philippine Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 198388, 28 July 2014; Jebsen Maritime Inc., v. Ravena, G.R. No. 200566, 17 September 2014; Gabunas v. Scanmar Maritime Services, 653 Phil. 457 (2010) citing Spouses Aya-ay v. Arpaphil Shipping Corporation, 516 Phil. 628 (2006); Sante v. Employees Compensation Commission, 256 Phil. 219 ((1989) citing Raro v. Employees Compensation Commission, 254 Phil. 846 (1989).
8 Underscoring supplied.
9 Jebsens Maritime v. Undag, 678 Phil. 938 (2011); Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Cruise Ships Catering International, N. V. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 630 Phil. 352 (2010); Nisda v. Sea Serve Maritime Agency, 611 Phil. 291 (2009).
10 576 Phil. 601 (2008).
11 Supra. Underscoring supplied.
12 G.R. No. 200566, 17 September 2014, 735 SCRA 494.
13 Supra. Underscoring supplied.
14 G.R. No. 204262, 7 June 2017.
15 Supra. Underscoring supplied.
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