G.R. No. L-41909, February 14, 1983,
♦ Decision, Relova, [J]
♦ Separate Opinions, Melencio-Herrera, De Castro, Plana & Vasquez [JJ]

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-41909 February 14, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PASTOR PASCO, defendant.-appellant.

Maximo Catane for defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.


Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I vote for affirmance. Unlike in other rape cases, there was an eyewitness herein to the crime committed, who was even approached by the accused minutes after the incident with the request "not to tell".




Separate Opinion

DE CASTRO, J., concurring:

On ground of reasonable doubt, I concur, That complainant did not undergo a vaginal examination can only mean that she did not ask for it, or gave no information to the doctor that would prompt the latter to perform such examination. This must be because complainant feared that such an examination will reveal her allegation of rape as a mere concoction.

I prefer to give more credence to the doctor's testimony that he was not told that complainant was raped to that of complainant that he was told, and still, notwithstanding, did not perform a vaginal examination.ℒαwρhi৷




Separate Opinion

PLANA, J., dissenting:

I believe the crime of rape has been established beyond reasonable doubt, even assuming that the complainant indeed failed to advise the doctor who examined her after the incident that she had been raped. This conclusion is sustained by the following:

1. The complainant was assaulted on June 29, 1974 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. The morning after (June 30), she went to the Police Headquarters of Oroquieta City and reported that she had been raped (TSN, Oct. 31, 1974, p. 17). In support of her complaint, she made a written statement before the police detailing the rape incident (Record, p. 8).

2. She was thereafter taken to the Assistant City Fiscal of Oroquieta before whom she swore to the written statement she had executed before the police.

3. On July 1, 1974, the complainant filed her sworn complaint for rape in the City Court of Oroquieta (Exhibits B and B-1).

4. Testimony of the victim herself that she was raped by the accused who forcibly pressed her mouth in the process.

5. Testimony of eye witness Felipe Batoy who saw the accused in the act of raping the complainant ("the man [accused] being on top holding the mouth and doing sexual act") and shouted "hoy". (TSN, Nov. 4,1974, p. 21.)

6. Immediately following the assault, after the accused had run away upon being surprised in the act of rape by Felipe Batoy, the complainant confirmed to Batoy that she was indeed raped by Pastor Pasco (TSN, Nov. 4, 1974, p. 22).

7. Facial injuries suffered by the complainant, as attested to by the examining physician, corroborate her allegation that the accused had forcibly pressed her on the mouth (Exhibits A and A- 1).

8. Finally, the torn dress of complainant additionally corroborate her allegation of having been sexually abused (Exhibits C and C-1).

Against the foregoing evidence, I believe it would not matter much whether or not the complainant told or (perhaps by reason of her mental state or confusion at the time) failed to tell the examining doctor that she had been raped.

Additionally, since a medical finding indicating sexual abuse is not an indispensable requirement in a prosecution for rape, being merely corroborative, the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused would largely depend on the credibility of the witnesses, apart from corroborating documentary evidence. The trial court found the declarations of the offended party and eye witness Batoy credible, and convicted the accused. On the issue of credibility, I am not prepared to overturn the factual finding of the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. With specific reference to the complainant, the records do not disclose any reason why she-a 67 year old lady-would conjure a tale of rape and falsely pin that heinous crime on the accused. This is also true as regards eye witness Batoy.




Separate Opinion

VASQUEZ, J., dissenting:

The "reasonable doubt" upon which the acquittal of the accused is decreed in the main opinion is based solely on the alleged circumstance that the complainant failed to tell Dr. Reynaldo Pintacasi that she had been raped and that, as a matter of fact, the medical certificate issued by said doctor does not show an examination of her private parts. I would agree that this would be a vital circumstance to consider in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused for the crime of rape, if the record shall show sufficient evidentiary basis to sustain the finding that the offended party, indeed, had not complained to the examining physician about her having been raped by the appellant.

It is an admitted fact that the complainant went to the Chief of Police the day after the incident to file a complainst against the appellant for rape, and not for having been simply injured. After an investigation by the Chief of Police, she was referred to Dr. Pintacasi who found injuries on her chin and right cheek. Dr. Pintacasi issued a medical certificate which contained no finding as to the complainant's private parts. This fact, however, does not necessarily mean that the complainant did not tell Dr. Pintacasi that she had been raped, nor that such an examination was not made.

As to whether Dr. Pintacasi was told that the offended party had been raped, the testimony of the complainant cited in the main opinion contains conflicting answers. Her vascillation on this point could have been undoubtedly due to her hesitancy to declare in open court that she, a woman 67 years of age, had been sexually abused in a banana plantation. The failure of Dr. Pintacasi to conduct a vaginal examination, if true, could readily be explained by the fact that, as he stated during the second time that such an examination was requested due to the lack of any finding to that effect in the original medical certificate that he issued, he believed that such an examination was "useless". This attitude of Dr. Pintacasi was presumably because he expected that the signs of rape would not be manifested in the complainant's private parts due to her advanced age. While it is true that Dr. Pintacasi had testified that the offended party did not tell him about having been raped, such testimony on his part was but to be expected considering that his medical certificate did not contain a finding of his examination of the private parts of the complainant. To admit that the complainant informed him of the rape would reflect on his competence, he having failed either to make the necessary vaginal examination which was what he should have done considering the purpose of the examination; or having done so, he failed to indicate his finding in the medical certificate that he issued.

The undisputed fact remains that the complainant sustained injuries during the incident that she had with the appellant. Such injuries could not have been caused in the manner testified to by the appellant, to wit: "having seen the complainant, he pushed her back causing the complainant to loosen her hold on the bamboo pool which hit her face". This explanation is too improbable and unlikely, and could not have been reason enough for the complainant to file a charge against the appellant that would require admitting or proclaiming publicly that she had been sexually abused by the appellant.

I accordingly vote to affirm the decision appealed from.


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