EN BANC
G.R. No. L-61388 April 20, 1983
IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ. JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ. JOSEFINA GARCIA-PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN, FABIAN C. VER, GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, and FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Efren M Mercado and Alexander Padilla for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J., concurring:
Concuring in the result and in overruling the Lansang case.
Separate Opinion
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
In the result and in overruling Lansang. I reserve my right on the question of bail.
Separate Opinion
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
Concurring in the result with qualification primarily on the respect that must be accorded the constitutional right to bail once a case is filed and dissenting as to the overruling of Lansang v. Garcia.
It does not admit of doubt that the question posed in this petition for the writ of habeas corpus, and in other similar petitions for that matter, is impressed with significance that calls for the highest degree of care and circumspection. The result arrived at by the Court is that once a presidential commitment order is issued, the detention is rendered valid and legal, the right to be released of the person detained even after the filing of charges being dependent on the President "who may order the release of a detainee or his being placed under house arrest, as he has done in meritorious cases."1 The exhaustive opinion of the Court penned by Justice de Castro likewise re-examines the Lansang doctrine2 which ruled that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus raises a judicial rather than a political question and reverts to the principle announced in the earlier cases of Barcelon v. Baker3 and Montenegro v. Castañeda,4 both of which held that the question raised is political in character.
I concur in the ruling that while as a general rule preventive detention is an obstacle to judicial inquiry, this Court is empowered where compelling reasons exist to inquire into the matter. Moreover, the judiciary once a case has been filed has jurisdiction to act on a petition for bail. I dissent insofar as the decision overrules Lansang v. Garcia.
1. Petitioners in their application for the writ of liberty assert an infringement of a right that finds shelter in the fundamental law. This Court, both in normal times and under emergency conditions, is not susceptible to the accusation that it has not accorded the most careful study to a plea of such character. Petitioners were heard and their cases decided. In addition to Lansang, People v. Ferrer,5 Aquino Jr. v. Ponce Enrile6 and Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission No. 27 may be cited. This Tribunal then has not been insensible to its duty to render fealty to the applicable mandates of the Constitution. That is to be true to the primordial concept first announced in the landmark decision of Marbury v. Madison,8 the opinion being rendered by the illustrious Chief Justice Marshall, enunciating the principle of judicial review. Our Constitution is quite clear on the matter. So it was held in Angara v. Electoral Tribunal,9 the first case of transcendental importance under the 1935 Charter. It is quite manifest that judicial review is not only a power but a duty.10
2. Thus the judiciary can be appealed to and in appropriate cases, annul executive or legislative acts. For as so often stressed, "the Constitution is not only law, but a higher law, to which other law must bow."11 Professor Black went on to state: "Here, I think, we are laboring the obvious. The superior status of the Constitution is clearer even than its standing as law. But if it is of superior status, and if it is law, then it is law of a superior status. Again, the important thing is not whether some flaw could be found in the logic by which this was established. The logic of human institutions is a logic of probability. The important thing is that this concept of the superior status of the Constitution as law very early became and has since continued to be a standard part of the way in which the American lawyer and judge and citizen look at their government.ℒαwρhi৷"12 This is not to deny the possibility of judicial interference with policy formulation, better left to the political branches. It is an entirely different matter of course where the question is one of liberty.
3. An inquiry into the validity of executive or legislative act has been fitly characterized as both awesome and delicate. Nonetheless, for the judiciary, there is no choice. To repeat, it is a duty to be performed. This is so especially where the writ of habeas corpus has been invoked. It is then incumbent on a court to pass on the legality of the detention. As I had occasion to state in my separate opinion in Aquino Jr. vs. Enrile:13 "This Court has to act then. The liberty enshrined in the Constitution, for the protection of which habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy, imposes that obligation. Its task is clear. It must be performed. That is a trust to which it cannot be recreant. Whenever the grievance complained of is deprivation of liberty, it is its responsibility to inquire into the matter and to render the decision appropriate under the circumstances. Precisely, a habeas corpus petition calls for that response."14 It cannot be overemphasized that the writ of habeas corpus, as a constitutional right, it, for eminent commentators, protean in scope. A reference to the opinion of the Court in Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons15 may not be amiss. Thus: "The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease. "16 It continues: "Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as 'The most important human rights provision' in the fundamental law. Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as 'One of the principal safeguards to personal liberty.' For Willoughby, it is 'the greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and illegal imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered.' Burdick echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as 'One of the most important bulwarks of liberty.' Fraenkel made it unanimous, for to him. 'Without it much else would be of no avail.' Thereby the rule of law is assured. A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of liberty coupled with its limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief Justices Arellano, Avancena, Abad Santos, Paras, Bengzon and [Chief Justice Concepcion]. It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to emphasize quite a few times the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach."17
4. So it is in the United States. As so well put by Justice Brennan in Fay v. Noia:18 "We do well to bear in mind the extraordinary prestige of the Great Writ, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, in Anglo-American jurisprudence: 'the most celebrated writ in English Law,' 3 Blackstone Commentaries 129. It is 'a writ antecedent to statute, and throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law * * *. It is perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint and confinement. It is of immemorial antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the thirty-third year of Edward I. 'Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien [1923] AC 603, 609 (HL) Received into our own law in the colonial period, given explicit recognition in the Federal Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 2, incorporated in the first grant of federal court jurisdiction, Act of September 24, 1978, c 20, sec. 14, 1 State 81, 82, habeas corpus was earlier confirmed by Chief Justice John Marshall to be a 'Great constitutional privilege.' Ex parte Bollman and Swartout (US) 4 Cranch 75, 95, 2L ed 554, 561. Only two Terms ago this Court had occasion to reaffirm the high place of the writ in our jurisprudence: 'We repeat what has been so truly said of the federal writ: "there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired," Bowen v. Johnston, 306 US 19, 26, 83 L ed 455, 461, 59 S Ct 442 (1939), and unsuspended, save only in the cases specified in our Constitution.' Smith v. Bennett, 365 US 708, 713, 6 1 ed 2d 39, 43, 81 s Ct. 895. "19
5. To repeat, it is the ruling of this Court that an issuance of a presidential commitment order imparts validity to a detention the right to be released of the person detained even after the filing of charges being dependent on the President who may order such release or his being placed under house arrest. As I mentioned at the outset, I yield a qualified concurrence. The power of preventive detention where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended has been recognized.20 The lifting of martial law unfortunately has not been followed by a restoration of peace and order in certain sections of the country. In the proclamation lifting martial law, the last paragraph of the whereas clause spoke of the awareness of the government and the Filipino people of public safety continuing "to require a degree of capability to deal adequately with elements who persist in endeavoring to overthrow the government by violent means and exploiting every opportunity to disrupt [its] peaceful and productive" efforts.21 Accordingly, in terminating the state of martial law throughout the Philippines, it was provided: "that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect; and Provided that in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents therein, the suspension of the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall continue; and in all other places the suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also continue with respect to persons at present detained as well as others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion; conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith; * * *."22 That is the basis for the preventive detention of petitioners in this case.
6. The President as commander-in-chief may call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion and in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, "may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."23 There are thus three alternatives which may be availed to meet a grave public danger to the security of the state. As pointed out by Chief Justice Concepcion in Lansang, prior to the suspension of the privilege of the writ in 1971, the armed forces had been called out, but such a move "proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2) other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh."24 Even if only the first alternative were resorted to, the executive could still exercise the power of preventive detention. Moyer v. Peabody,25 decided by the American Supreme Court, the opinion being penned by Justice Holmes, may be cited. According to the statement of the facts of that case, "it appeared that the governor had declared a county to be in a state of insurrection, had called out troops to put down the trouble, and had ordered that the plaintiff should be arrested as a leader of the outbreak, and should be detained until he could be discharged with safety, and that then he should be delivered to the civil authorities, to be dealt with according to law."26 On those facts the American Supreme Court held that preventive detention was allowable, the test of its validity being one of good faith. The state governor then could "make the ordinary use of the soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons who resist, and, of course, that he may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but are by way of precaution, to prevent the exercise of hostile power. So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office, on the ground that he had not reasonable ground for his belief."27 The last paragraph of Justice Holmes opinion was even more emphatic: "When it comes to a decision by the head of the state upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. See Keely v. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441, 446, 25 L. ed. 327, 328. This was admitted with regard to killing men in the actual clash of arms; and we think it obvious, although it was disputed, that the same is true of temporary detention to prevent apprehended harm. As no one would deny that there was immunity for ordering a company to fire upon a mob in insurrection, and that a state law authorizing the governor to deprive citizens of life under such circumstances was consistent with the 14th Amendment, we are of opinion that the same is true of a law authorizing by implication that was done in this case."28 Nonetheless, while preventive detention is a proper measure to cope with the danger arising from the insurrection or rebellion, it may continue for such length of time as to make it punitive in character. If such were the case, I am not prepared to yield concurrence to the view that this Court is devoid of the power in a habeas corpus proceeding to inquire into the legality of the detention. As to when such a stage is reached cannot be set forth with precision. The test would be an appraisal of the environmental facts of each case. This is not to deny that the presumption must be in favor not only of the good faith characterizing the presidential action but of the absence of any arbitrary taint in so ordering preventive detention. It is out of excess of caution and due to the belief that habeas corpus as a writ of liberty should not be unnecessarily curtailed that I feel compelled to qualify my concurrence in that respect.
7. Nor is this all. Once a case is filed, the party detained may avail himself of the right to bail. If there be such a petition, the court has jurisdiction to grant or to deny bail in accordance with the constitutional provision.29 Inasmuch as the return to the writ filed by the Solicitor General states that a warrant of arrest against detainee Dra. Aurora Parong was issued on August 4, 1982, by the Municipal Court of Bayombong, for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, then clearly she has a right to invoke such right, notwithstanding the suspension of the privilege of the writ. So I did argue as counsel in Hernandez v. Montesa,30 where a majority of this Court with one vote lacking to make their conclusion doctrinal agreed with such submission. There was adherence to such a view in my separate opinions in Lansang31 and in Buscayno v. Enrile,32 I do again and to that extent dissent.
8. It may be worthwhile to touch briefly on the exercise of power of preventive detention in other jurisdictions. The retired Lord President of the Federal Court of Malaysia Tun Mohamed Suffian in his work on the Malaysian constitution, spoke of the emergency powers of the executive, the Yang Dipertuan Agung in this wise: " If the Yang Dipertuan Agung (acting on Cabinet advice) is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security or economic life of the Federation or any part thereof is threatened, article 150 empowers him to issue a proclamation of emergency. He has done so thrice: first, to meet the emergency caused by Indonesian confrontation, secondly, to meet the emergency caused by the political crisis arising out of the position of the Chief Minister of Sarawak and, thirdly, to meet the emergency caused as a result of the violence that erupted on 13th May, 1969. (The 1948-1960 emergency was proclaimed under pre-independence law, not under the constitution). If a proclamation of emergency is issued when Parliament is not sitting, the Yang Dipertuan Agung must summon Parliament as soon as may be practicable. Until both Houses of Parliament are sitting, he may promulgate ordinances having the force of law, if satisfied that immediate action is required."33 By virtue of such competence, preventive detention may be ordered.34 The power of preventive detention is likewise recognized in India. According to Professor Jain, in a leading article, it "prevails in many democratic countries and in some form or other, at one time or other, each democratic country has taken recourse to preventive detention, especially during the war period."35 He mentioned the United States Internal Security Act enacted by its Congress in 1950 for emergency detention "during an emergency of war, invasion or domestic insurrection of a person about whom there is a reasonable ground to believe that he would probably engage in acts of sabotage or espionage. The U.S. Constitution also provides for suspension of habeas corpus during rebellion or invasion if public safety so requires."36 He likewise referred to England, citing Regulation 14B of the Defense of Realm Act Regulations, 1914, during World War I and Regulation 18B of the Defense Regulations during World War II which according to him led to the celebrated case of Liversidge v. Anderson.37 Then he turned to his own country: "In India, because of unstable law and order situation, preventive detention has been in vogue since its independence in 1947. After the commencement of the Constitution, Parliament enacted the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, to lay down a legal framework for preventive detention on certain grounds. The present day law for the purpose is the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. A salient feature of the law of preventive detention in India has been to confer a very broad discretion on the administrative authority to order preventive detention of a person in certain circumstances."38 He spoke of the relevant constitutional provisions having a bearing on preventive detention: "A law for preventive detention can be made by Parliament exclusively under entry 9, List 1, for reasons connected with 'defensee', 'foreign affairs' or the 'security of India.' Further, under entry 3, List 111, Parliament and the State Legislatures can concurrently make a law for preventive detention for reasons connected with the " security of a State', maintenance of public order,' or 'maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.' Parliament thus has a wide legislative jurisdiction in the matter as it can enact a law of preventive detention for reasons connected with all the six heads mentioned above. The Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and now the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, have been enacted by Parliament providing for preventive detention for all these six heads."39 For him the law of preventive detention in India "has therefore been too much administrative-ridden and the scope of judicial review has been very much limited."40 He made a careful study of the cases on preventive detention in India. As he pointed out, "the range and magnitude of administrative control over the individual's personal liberty is very vast, and the range of judicial control is very restrictive, as the basic question, whether a person should be detained or not on the facts and circumstances of the case, hes within the scope of administrative discretion and beyond judicial review."41 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of India, as he stressed, "in the interest or maintaining constitutionalism," has been able to take "a somewhat broad view of its restricted powers, and has given whatever relief it can to the detained persons."42 For me that approach has much to recommend it. This is not to deny that in the event there is a misapprehension as to the actual facts that led to the preventive detention, the plea for remedial action should, in the first instance, be addressed to the President. Very likely, there will be an affirmative response. Even then, the assurance to a party feeling aggrieved that there could still be resort to judicial review, even if utilized only in rare and exceptional cases, may conduce to a deeper sense of loyalty to the existing constitutional order on the part of the misguided or disaffected individuals. Hence, to repeat, this qualified concurrence on my part.
9. The opinion of the Court, however, did not stop at dismissing the petition on the ground that the issuance of a presidential commitment order validates the preventive detention of petitioners. It went farther by reexamining the unanimous ruling in Lansang to the effect that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus raises a judicial rather than a political question and holding that it is no longer authoritative. With due respect, I cannot agree to such a conclusion. In the first place, there was no need to go that far. For me, at least, the rationale that this Court must accord deference to a presidential committment order suffices for the decision of this case. Nor would I limit my dissent on that ground alone. It is for me, and again I say this with due respect, deplorable and unjustifiable for this Court to turn its back on a doctrine that has elicited praise and commendation from eminent scholars and jurists here and abroad.
10. That is easily understandable. The learned, comprehension and unanimous Lansang opinion penned by Chief Justice Concepcion concurred in by all the Justices,43 to my mind, explains with lucidity and force why the question is judicial rather than political. Thus: "Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended * * *.' It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege 'in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion'- or, under Art. VII of the Constitution, 'imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.' For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility."44 The then Chief Justice continued: "Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that the suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that system, namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes, as well as demands, the right of every single member of our citizenry to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce, the views, the policies and the practices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonwealth, regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right- which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest order- is vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation and wholesome growth and development."45
11. One of the merits of the ponencia of Chief Justice Concepcion is that it is infused with a sense of realism. These are his words: "Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by the Constitution and the context of the Rules of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law- such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must be forewarned against mistaking mere dissent-no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be-fore dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less-refuse-when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied-to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to epitomize."46
12. After which this Court, as set forth in the Lansang opinion, considered "the precise nature" of its function: "Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme."47 Further: "In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check-not to supplant-the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power of the Court to determine the validity of the contested proclamation is far from being Identical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin."48 It is clear the competence of this Court to pass upon the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ is confined within limits that preclude the assumption of power that rightfully belongs to the Executive. There would then be, to my mind, no sufficient Justification to retreat from a position that assures judicial participation on a matter of momentous consequence. Moreover, to the extent that such a move has had the benefit of judicial appraisal, and thereafter approval, to that extent there may be less valid opposition and hopefully greater understanding of why such a step had to be taken.
13. With Lansang overruled, the doctrine that the suspension of the privilege of the writ announced in Barcelon v. Baker49 and Montenegro v. Castañeda50 will be revived. This for me is unfortunate. The Montenegro decision, as I had occasion to state "owed its existence to the compulsion exerted by Barcelon v. Baker, a 1905 decision. This Court was partly misled by an undue reliance in the latter case on what it considered to be authoritative pronouncements from such illustrious American jurists as Marshall, Story, and Taney. That is to misread what was said by them. This is most evident in the case of Chief Justice Marshall, whose epochal Marbury v. Madison was cited. Why that was so is difficult to understand. For it speaks to the contrary. It was by virtue of this decision that the function of judicial review owes its origin notwithstanding the absence of any explicit provision in the American Constitution empowering the courts to do so. Thus: 'It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.'"51 The opinion went on to say: "Nor is the excerpt from Justice Story, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, in Martin v. Mott, as made clear in the opinion of the Chief Justice, an authority directly in point. There, a militiaman had been convicted of failing to respond to a call, made under the Act of 1795, to serve during the War of 1812. His property was taken to satisfy the judgment. He brought an action of replevin. The American Constitution empowers its Congress 'to provide for calling forth the Militia' in certain cases, and Congress did provide that in those cases the President should have authority to make the call." All that Justice Story did in construing the statute in the light of the language and purpose of her Constitution was to recognize the authority of the American President to decide whether the exigency has arisen. In stating that such power was exclusive and thus had a conclusive effect, he relied on the language employed, impressed with such a character. The constitutional provision on the suspension of the privilege of the writ is, as shown, anything but that. Chief Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden, likewise had to deal with a situation involving the calling out of the militia. As a matter of fact, an eminent commentator speaking of the two above decisions had this apt observation: "The common element in these opinions would seem to be a genuine judicial reluctance to speak in a situation where the voice of the Court, even if heard, could not have any effect. More than this, both Story and Taney seem to share the suspicion, unusual in them, that under a popular form of government there are certain questions that the political branches must be trusted to answer with finality. What was said next is even more pertinent. Thus: 'It would be dangerous and misleading to push the principles of these cases too far, especially the doctrine of "political questions" as implied in Luther v. Borden. Given the opportunity to afford a grievously injured citizen relief from a palpably unwarranted use of presidential or military power, especially when the question at issue falls in the penumbra between the "political" and the "justiciable", the Court will act as if it had never heard of this doctrine and its underlying assumption that there are some powers against which the judiciary simply cannot be expected to act as the last line of defense.' It would thus seem evident that support for the hitherto prevailing Montenegro ruling was rather frail. Happily, with our decision, it is no longer capable of the mischief to which it does lend itself of an undue diminution of judicial power to the prejudice of constitutional rights."52
14. An opinion of a court, especially this Tribunal, should not ignore the environmental facts which gave rise to a litigation where the issues arise from problems inseparable from national security. There is, in addition, the need to take into consideration the pressure of contemporary events. For as has so often been stressed, judicial process does not take place in a social void. The questions before the Court are to be viewed with full awareness of the consequences attendant to the decision reached. As so tersely expressed by Justice Tuason in Araneta v. Dinglasan:"53 "We test a rule by its results."54 More often than not especially during times of stress, it is inescapable that efforts be made to reconcile time-tested principles to contemporary problems. The judiciary is called upon to do its part. There is wisdom in these words of Justice Tuason from the same opinion: "The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances, 'The various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial,' given the ability to act, are called upon 'to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively.'"55 To repeat, I accord the fullest respect to the mode and manner in which my brethren performed their duty and discharged their responsibility in passing upon the transcendental question raised in this petition. With the basic premise of robust concern for individual rights to which I have been committed,however, I have no choice except to vote the way I did, even if for those whose opinions I value conformity with the hitherto unquestioned verities may at times prove to be less than adequate to meet the exigencies of the turbulent present.
Footnotes
1 Decision, 17.
2 L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448.
3 5 Phil. 87 (1905).
4 91 Phil. 882 (1952).
5 L-32613, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382.
6 L-35546, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183.
7 L-37364, May 9,1975,63 SCRA 546.
8 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
9 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
10 Cf. In addition to Angara, there is likewise the case of Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
11 Black, The People and the Court, 8 (1960).
12 Ibid., 8-9.
13 L-35546, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183.
14 Ibid., 286.
15 L-30026, January 30,1971, 37 SCRA 420.
16 Ibid., 423.
17 Ibid., 423-424. The quotation from Chafee is found in The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 Boston Univ. Law Rev. 143 (1947); from Cooley in 2 Constitutional Limitations 709 (1927); from Willoughby in 3 on the Constitution 1612 (1929); from Burdick in the Law of the American Constitution 27 (1922); from Fraenkel in Our Civil Liberties 6 (1944).
18 372 US 391 (1963).
19 Ibid., 399-400.
20 Cf. Lansang v. Garcia, L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448; Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905); Montenegro v. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952).
21 Proclamation No. 2045 (1981).
22 Ibid.
23 Article VII, Sec. 9 of the Constitution.
24 42 SCRA 448, 488.
25 212 US 78.
26 Ibid., 83.
27 Ibid., 84-85.
28 Ibid., 86.
29 According to Article IV, Sec. 18 of the Constitution: "All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required. "
30 90 Phil. 172 (1951). It is reported along with Nava v. Gatmaitan and Angeles v. Abaya in a single resolution.
31 42 SCRA 448.
32 L-47185, January 15, 1981, 102 SCRA 7.
33 Suffian, (1976), An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, 226.
34 Cf. Malaysia Soo Kua v. Public Prosecutor [1970] 1. Malaysian Law Journal 91; Karam Singh v. The Minister of Internal Affairs [1969] 2. Malaysian Law Journal 129; Phong Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor (1977) 1 Malaysian Law Journal 70. The above provision is likewise applicable to Singapore. This decision from that jurisdiction may be cited: Lim Hock Siew v. Minister of Interior and Defense [1918] 2 Malaysian Law Journal 219. There is likewise relevance to these articles: Hickling, The Prerogative in Malaysia 17 Malaya Law Review 207 (1975) and Jayakumar, Emergency Powers in Malaysia 18 Malaya Law Review 149 (1976).
35 Jain, Judicial Creativity and Preventive Detention in India, 262.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., Liversidge is reported in [1942] A.C. 206.
38 Ibid., 263.
39 Ibid., 263-264.
40 Ibid., 263.
41 Ibid., 303-304.
42 Ibid., 304.
43 I had a separate opinion, dissenting in part, but I concurred in the holding that the question is judicial rather than political.
44 42 SCRA 448, 473-474.
45 Ibid., 474-475.
46 Ibid., 475.
47 Ibid., 479-480.
48 Ibid., 480.
49 5 Phil. 87.
50 91 Phil. 882 (1952).
51 42 SCRA 448, 505-506.
52 Ibid., 506-507.
53 84 Phil. 368 (1949).
54 Ibid., 376.
55 Ibid., 383.
Separate Opinion
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the all-encompassing scope of the main opinion of Mr. Justice de Castro which would overturn the landmark doctrine of Lansang vs. Garcia1 which upheld the Supreme Court's authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases for the President's suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof and would revert to the retrogressive and colonial era ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker2 and Montenegro vs. Castañeda3 that the President's decision to so suspend the privilege of the writ "is final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons," and would further deny the right to bail even after the filing of charges in court to persons detained under Presidential Commitment Orders.
This case, as in other like cases, focuses on the grievances that persons detained or charged for the crimes of insurrection, rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, invariably bring to this Court. They complain, as petitioners do here, of being arrested without any warrant of arrest; of being informed of purported telegrams concerning the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order PCO authorizing their arrest and detention, but that they are not given a copy of such PCO nor notified of its contents, raising doubts whether such PCO has in fact been issued; of being kept in isolation or transferred to so-called "safehouses" and being denied of their constitutional right to counsel and to silence; of prolonged detention without charges; "of a seeming deliberate and concerted effort by respondents to conceal from counsel and relatives the detainees' place of detention, raising the apprehension that respondents are using force, violence, threat, intimidation and other means which vitiate free will to obtain confessions and statements from the detainees in violation of their constitutional rights;" and of their counsel and families undergoing great difficulties in locating or having access to them (main opinion at p. 3).
The State through the Solicitor General on the other hand invariably denies all such charges and submits affidavits of the arresting officers and detention custodian that detainees are afforded decent and humane treatment, further countering that such claims are merely calculated to arouse sympathy and as propaganda against the Government and its institutions.
In many such cases, however, the Court in issuing the writ of habeas corpus requiring respondents to make a return of the writ includes a resolution, in recognition of the detainees' constitutional rights, "to allow counsel for petitioners to visit and confer with the detainee(s) in an atmosphere of confidentiality consistent with reasonable security measures which respondents may impose."4 In other cases where respondents military officials have allegedly denied having in their custody the person(s) detained, the Court has issued its resolution "on the assumption that the detained person is in the custody of respondents, that there be due observance and respect of his right to counsel and other constitutional rights by respondents."5
Respondents' return through the Solicitor General in the case at bar states that the detainees are all detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order issued on July 12, 1982 (several days after their arrest without warrant on July 6 and 7, 1982) and that corresponding charges against the detainees were filed in court and before the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Viscaya where they are pending. As to the detainee Dr. Aurora Parong, the return further states that a warrant of arrest was issued against her on August 4, 1982 by the Municipal Court of Bayombong for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition. As in all other returns in similar cases, the Solicitor General asserts "that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing as to them. Courts cannot inquire into the validity and cause of their arrest and detention" by virtue of the continued suspension, under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 (which proclaimed the termination of martial law in the Philippines), of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao and in all other places with respect to persons detained for suspected involvement in crimes related to national security.
The main opinion confronts the question of whether the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has provided the legal basis of the detention of herein detainees following their arrest for Proclamation No. 2045-covered offenses," and remarks that "this question has to be set at rest promptly and decisively, if we are to break a seemingly continuous flow of petitions for habeas corpus, as what had been seen lately of such petitions being filed in this Court one after the other.
I. I submit that the resolution of the issues in this case does not call for the all-encompassing ruling in the main opinion with its sweeping scope that would reexamine and overturn the benchmark ruling in Lansang. The limited suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the two instances provided under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 has not been challenged in this case. So, what's the point of an advance declaration that all checks and barriers are down? Lansang recognizes the greatest deference and respect that is due the President's determination for the necessity of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. But Lansang sets at the same time the constitutional confines and limits of the President's power to suspend the privilege of the writ and enunciates the constitutional test, not of the correctness of the President's decision, but that the President's decision to suspend the privilege not suffer from the constitutional infirmity of arbitrariness.6 Thus, after laying the premise "that every case must depend on its own circumstances," the Court therein thru then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion held that:
Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended ....' It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege 'in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion'- or, under Art. VII of the Constitution, 'imminent danger thereof '- 'when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.' Far from being fun and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when ? the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility.
Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that the suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that system. namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes, as well as demands, the right of every single member of our citizenry to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce, the views, the policies and the practices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonwealth, regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right-which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest order is-vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation and wholesome growth and development.
Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and exercise, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by the Constitution and the context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion- there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must before warned against mistaking mere dissent- no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be-for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse- when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied- to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to epitomize. "7
II. The crucial issue at bar is that adversely decided by the main opinion, denying petitioners' motion that the Court order their release on bail, on the ground that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 "includes, as a necessary consequence, the withholding for the duration of the suspension of the privilege of the right to bail" (main opinion, at page 16).
1. I submit that notwithstanding the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the issuance on March 9, 1982 of Letter of Instruction No. 1211 that the Presidential Commitment Order constitutes authority to keep the subject person under detention "until ordered released by the President or his duly authorized representative" (which is a mere internal instruction to certain agencies), the higher and superior mandate of the Constitution guarantees the right to bail and vests the courts with the jurisdiction and judicial power to grant bail which may not be removed nor diminished nor abdicated. We cannot but so hold, if we are to be true to the fundamental precept that "The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all circumstances."
The argument that otherwise the purpose of the suspension of the privilege would be defeated ignores the overwhelming capability of the State and its military and police forces to keep suspects under surveillance and the courts' imposition of reasonable conditions in granting bail, such as periodic reports to the authorities concerned, and prohibiting their going to certain critical areas.
2. The most authoritative pronouncement in this regard is of course none other than the President's himself. In all the metropolitan newspapers of April 20, 1983, the President is reported to have "said that Pimentel has been charged with rebellion before the regional trial court of Cebu City and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the civil court and not only under the jurisdiction of the military by virtue of the PCO." In a telegram in reply to the appeal of Msgr. Patrick Cronin, Archbishop of Cagayan de Oro and Misamis Oriental, for lifting of the PCO on Mayor Aquilino Pimentel of Cagayan de Oro City, the President said that "(T)he disposal of the body of the accused, as any lawyer will inform you, is now within the powers of the regional trial court of Cebu City and not within the powers of the President. "
3. This is but in consonance with the majority holding in the leading 1951 cases of Nava vs. Gatmaitan and Hernandez vs. Montesa8 (although it failed one vote short of the required majority of six affirmative votes at the time) as expounded by then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras and Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Cesar Bengzon and Associate Justices Pedro Tuason, Alex Reyes and Fernando Jugo that after formal indictment in court by the filing against them of an information charging rebellion with multiple murder, etc., accused persons covered by the proclamation of suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are entitled to the right to bail.
4. As stressed by then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras, "(T)he right to bail, along with the right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17, of the Constitution), tends to aid the accused to prove his innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori imply the suspension of all his other rights (even the right to be tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence, absolute freedom. The latter result is not insisted upon for being patently untenable. "
Then Chief Justice Paras stressed that "... The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies the suspension of the right to bail, they would have very easily provided that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong and except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. As stated in the case of Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 297, the Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right, leaving the rest to remain forever inviolable. "
5. It is noteworthy and supportive of the prevailing stand since 1951 that the other great constitutional rights remain forever inviolable since the Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus), that there has been no amendment of the Constitution to curtail the right to bail in case of such suspension notwithstanding the numerous constitutional amendments adopted after the 1973 Constitution.
6. The late Justice Pedro Tuason emphasized that "(T)o the plea that the security of the State would be jeopardized by the release of the defendants on bail, the answer is that the existence of danger is never a justification for courts to tamper with the fundamental rights expressly granted by the Constitution. These rights are immutable, inflexible, yielding to no pressure of convenience, expediency or the so-called 'judicial statesmanship.' The Legislature itself cannot infringe them, and no court conscious of its responsibilities and limitations would do so. If the Bill of Rights are incompatible with stable government and a menace to the Nation, let the Constitution be amended, or abolished. It is trite to say that, while the Constitution stands, the courts of justice as the repository of civil liberty are bound to protect and maintain undiluted individual rights."
7. And former Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon then made the same forceful plea echoed these days by men of goodwill that respect for constitutional and human rights and adherence to the rule of law would help in the fight against rebellion and movement for national reconciliation, thus: "And in my opinion, one of the surest means to ease the uprising is a sincere demonstration of this Government's adherence to the principles of the Constitution together with an impartial application thereof to all citizens, whether dissidents or not. Let the rebels have no reason to apprehend that their comrades now under custody are being railroaded into Muntinglupa, without benefit of those fundamental privileges which the experience of the ages has deemed essential for the protection of all persons accused of crime before the tribunal of justice. Give them the assurance that the judiciary, ever mindful of its sacred mission, will not, thru faulty or misplaced devotion, uphold any doubtful claims of governmental power in diminution of individual rights, but will always cling to the principles uttered long ago by Chief Justice Marshall that when in doubt as to the construction of the Constitution, 'The Courts will favor personal liberty.'"
8. The right to bail cannot just be cancelled out summarily because of the issuance of a PCO In the case at bar, detainee Dr. Aurora Parong is charged in the municipal court with the crime of illegal possession of firearm, which is a clearly bailable offense. The charges filed against the other detainees are likewise for clearly bailable offenses. It is elementary that the right to bail in non-capital offenses and even in capital offenses where evidence of guilt is not strong will be generally granted and respected by the courts, "the natural tendency of the courts (being) towards a fair and liberal appreciation," particularly taking into consideration the record and standing of the person charged and the unlikelihood of his fleeing the court's jurisdiction.
As the Court held in the leading case of Montano vs. Ocampo9 wherein the Supreme Court granted bail to Senator Montano who was charged with multiple murders and frustrated murders:
Brushing aside the charge that the prelimiminary investigation of this case by the aforesaid Judge was railroaded, the same having been conducted at midnight, a few hours after the complaint was filed, we are of the opinion that, upon the evidence adduced in the applicaction for bail in the lower court, as such evidence is recited lengthily in the present petition and the answer thereto, and extensively analyzed and discussed in the oral argument, there is not such clear showing of guilt as would preclude all reasonable probability of any other conclusion.
Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has been toward a fair and liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise , of the evidence in the determination of the degree of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to war. rant a deprivation of that right.
Besides, to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it must also appear that in case of conviction the defendant 's liability would probably call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before this Court has been made.
In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose of confining accusedin jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the dependant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution.
The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the defendant's official and social standing and his other personal circumstances, seems remote if not nil."
In the recent case of Sobremonte vs. Enrile,10 the detainee was released upon her filing of the recommended P1,000.00 bail bond for the offense of possession of subversive literature with which she was charged and the habeas corpus petition, like many others, although dismissed for having thereby become moot, accomplished the purpose of securing the accused's release from prolonged detention. The Court had occasion to decry therein that "all the effort, energy and manhours expended by the parties and their counsel, including this Court, ... could have been avoided had the officers of the AVSECOM and the ISAFP responded promptly to the inquiries of petitioner instead of giving her the 'run-around' by referring her from one office to another."
9. "The continuous flow of petitions for habeas corpus" filed with this Court should not be decried nor discouraged. The Court stands as the guarantor of the constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and must see to it that the rights are respected and enforced. It is settled in his jurisdiction that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment or before whom the case is pending is ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention.11 So accused persons deprived of the constitutional right of speedy trial have been set free.12 And likewise persons detained indefinitely without charges so much so that the detention becomes punitive and not merely preventive in character are entitled to regain their freedom. The spirit and letter of our Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a person be detained indefinitely without any charges.
III. The main opinion invokes "a time of war or grave peril to the nation" (at page 16), oblivious of the Presidents lifting of martial law under Proclamation No. 2045 on January 17, 1981 and the specific premises therein set forth that
WHEREAS, the Filipino people, having subdued threats to the stability of government, public order and security, are aware that the time has come to consolidate the gains attained by the nation under a state of martial law by assuming their normal political roles and shaping the national destiny within the framework of civil government and popular democracy:
WHEREAS, the experience gained by the nation under martial law in subduing threats to the stability of the government, public order and security, has enabled the Filipino people to rediscover their confidence in their ability to command the resources of national unity, patriotism, discipline and sense of common destiny;
WHEREAS, the government and the people are at the same time also aware that the public safety continues to require a degree of capability to deal adequately with elements who persist in endeavoring to overthrow the government by violent means and exploiting every opportunity to disrupt the peaceful and productive labors of the government; ..."
As to the "self-evident" submittal of the main opinion that "the duty of the judiciary to protect individual rights must yield to the power of the Executive to protect the State, for if the State perishes, the Constitution, with the Bill of Rights that guarantees the right to personal liberty, perishes with it" (at page 16), I can only recall the exhortation of the Holy Father John Paul II in his address to the Philippine nation on February 17, 1981, thus: "Even in exceptional situations that may at times arise, one can never justify any violation of the fundamental dignity of the human person or of the basic rights that safeguard this dignity. Legitimate concern for the security of a nation, as demanded by the common good, could lead to the temptation of subjugating to the State the human being and his or her dignity and rights. Any apparent conflict between the exigencies of security and of the citizens' basic rights must be resolved according to the fundamental principle-upheld always by the Church- that social organization exists only for the service of man and for the protection of his dignity, and that it cannot claim to serve the common good when human rights are not safeguaded. People will have faith in the safeguarding of their security and the promotion of their well-being only to the extent that they feel truly involved, and supported in their very humanity."
Footnotes
1 42 SCRA 448 (1971).
2 5 Phil. 87 (1905).
3 91 Phil. 882 (1952).
4 Resolution of July 30, 1982 in G.R. No. 61016 In re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Horacio R. Morales, Jr.
5 Resolution of April 4, 1983 in G.R. No. 63581 In re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Carl Gaspar.
6 42 SCRA at page 481.
7 Idem, at pages 473-475; emphasis copied.
8 Jointly decided with Angeles vs. Abaya and reported in 90 Phil. 172 (1951).
9 G.R. L-6352. Resolution of Jan. 29, 1953. 49 O.G. 1855; emphasis supplied. See Villasenor vs. Abancio, 21 SCRA 321.
10 G.R. No. 60602, Sept. 30, 1982, per Escolin, J.
11 Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420, 427.
12 Conde vs. Diaz, 45 Phil. 173.
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